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States v. Feola, 95 S. Ct. 1255 (1975).
Ralph Feola, Michael Farr, Henry Rosa, and Enriquito Alsondo
were arrested for assaulting and conspiring to assault federal officers
who were engaged in the performance of their official duties. The
charges stemmed from an attempt by Feola and his codefendants to
effectuate "a classic narcotics 'rip-off,'

"2

a ploy destined to fail due to

the convincing undercover roles played by two federal narcotics
agents. 3 Deceived by the agents' appearance as drug purchasers, the
conspirators designed a scheme whereby they hoped to obtain a substantial sum of money by selling sugar as heroin or by forcibly reliev4
ing the purchasers of their money.

At a rendezvous selected by the conspirators, the two agents became temporarily separated . 5 While one agent was examining the purported heroin, Alsondo, in an apparent effort to take the "buy" money,
7
assaulted the other agent. 6 Recognizing the urgency of the situation,
1 United States v. Alsondo, 486 F.2d 1339, 1341-42, modified on rehearing, 486
F.2d 1346 (2d Cir. 1973), rer'd in part sub nor. United States v. Feola, 95 S. Ct. 1255
(1975). The federal assault provision under which the parties were charged imposes a
fine of not more than $5,000 and/or imprisonment of up to three years upon anyone who
forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates, or interferes with any
person designated in section 1114 of this title while engaged in or on account of
the performance of his official duties ....
18 U.S.C. § 111 (1970).
The conspiracy charges were founded upon 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1970), which provides
in part:
If two or more persons conspire . . . to commit any offense against the
United States . . . and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the
object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not for more than five years, or both.
2 United States v. Feola, 95 S. Ct. 1255, 1259 (1975).
3 See id. The agents were employees of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous
Drugs. Id. They are included among the many specifically enumerated individuals protected by the federal assault provision. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 111, 1114 (1970).
4 See United States v. Feola, 95 S. Ct. 1255, 1259 (1975).
5 United States v. Alsondo, 486 F.2d 1339, 1341, modified on rehearing, 486 F.2d
1346 (2d Cir. 1973), ret'd in part sub nom. United States v. Feola, 95 S. Ct. 1255 (1975).
6 United States v. Alsondo, 486 F.2d 1339, 1341-42, modified on rehearing, 486
F.2d 1346 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd in part sub norn. United States v. Feola, 95 S. Ct. 1255
(1975).
7 The conspirators had apparently commandeered the apartment in which the "buy"
was to take place. See id. Aside from the manner in which he was ushered into a bedroom and left alone, the agent was alerted to the possibility of danger by his discovery
of the lessor bound and gagged in a closet. 486 F.2d at 1341 & n.3.
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the first agent quickly interceded, and, after a brief struggle, all four
parties were placed under arrest. 8 At trial, the Government contended that the defendants had either agreed in advance to assault
the officers, or had reasonably foreseen that possibility, and were,
therefore, guilty of conspiracy to assault federal officers. 9 The federal
district court judge instructed the jury that in order to convict the defendants of either the substantive offense of assault or the related
charge of conspiracy, it was unnecessary to find that they were aware
of their intended victims' federal status.10
In United States v. Alsondo," Feola, Rosa, and Alsondo appealed their convictions on the conspiracy charge, contending that
the supporting evidence was insufficient as a matter of law. 12 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, however, approached the case from the standpoint of"scienter"; i.e., whether the
defendants knew their intended victims were federal officers. 13 The
issue before the court was, therefore, whether either offense should
require proof that the guilty party had specific knowledge of his victim's public office.
The Alsondo court found that although it was unnecessary to
prove such knowledge to sustain a conviction for the substantive offense of assault, proof of scienter was necessary to establish the
requisite antifederal intent to sustain a conviction tinder the federal
criminal conspiracy statute.14 Upon examination of the jury instructions, the court determined that failure to charge on this essential
element of scienter constituted plain error,15 and, inasmuch as the
8 United States v. Alsondo, 486 F.2d 1339, 1342, modified on rehearing, 486 F.2d
1346 (2d Ci. 1973), rev'd in )art vib non. United States v. Feola, 95 S. Ct. 1255 (1975).

"id.
10 United States v. Feola, 95 S. Ct. 1255, 1259 (1975). The trial judge also imparted

an identical charge regarding those persons who impede or resist federal officers, as
well as the fact that an accused need not even know whom he is assaulting. Id. at n.7.
1 486 F.2d 1339, modified on rehearing, 486 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd in part
sub non. United States v. Feola, 95 S. Ct. 1255 (1975).
12 486 F.2d at 1344. None of the appellants took exception to the instructions given
the jury, apparently accepting the view that an accused's knowledge of the federal identity of his intended victim is not an essential element of either an assault or a conspiracy to assault a federal officer. Id.
The remaining defendant, Michael Farr, was tried and convicted with the other
conspirators, but was sentenced tinder the provisions of the Youth Corrections Act, 18
U.S.C. §§ 4209, 5010(b) (1970), and raised a separate appeal. United States v. Farr, 487
F.2d 1023, 1024 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 1422 (1975).
13486 F.2d at 1342. The terms "knowledge" and "scienter" are used interchangeably throughout this Note, each denoting an awareness on the part of an accused that
his intended victim is a federal officer.
14 Id. at 1343.
15Id. at 1344. An appellate court's authority to question jury charges is not entirely
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defendants' knowledge had not been considered a requisite element
of criminal conspiracy by the trial court, the evidence on that specific
issue was, necessarily, insufficient.1 6 The conspiracy convictions were
accordingly reversed, 17 and, after an initial ruling partially to the contrary,' 8 the assault convictions of all three appellants were affirmed.19
dependent upon the claims of the parties. "Plain errors or defects affecting substantial
rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court."
FED. R. CRiM. P. 52 (b).
In practice, a defendant's "substantial rights" are nearly always affected by a failure
to charge an essential element of the crime with which he is charged. 486 F.2d at 1344.
See, e.g., United States v. Fields, 466 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1972) (even where evidence of guilt is substantial, a failure to charge on an essential element requires a new
trial).
More specifically, the Alsondo court noted that the issue of scienter in the federal
assault provision "ha[s] been a fertile source for judicial willingness to invoke the 'plain
error' rule." 486 F.2d at 1344. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 464 F.2d 160, 162-64
(5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Rybicki, 403 F.2d 599, 602-04 (6th Cir. 1968).
Is 486 F.2d at 1344.
17 Id. at 1346.
IsId. Prior to rehearing, the appellate court had affirmed Alsondo's conviction for
an assault upon a federal officer, but reversed the assault convictions of Rosa and Feola
on the theory that their criminal responsibility had been founded upon the existence of
a conspiratorial objective among the parties. Id. at 1345-46. See Pinkerton v. United
States, 328 U.S. 640, 645-48 (1946) (discussion of a conspirator's liability for activities of
his coconspirators in furtherance of the criminal plan). See also 1 R. ANDERSON,
WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 90 (1957).
Since Feola had remained hidden in a closet throughout the entire affair, there was
no evidence to link him to a direct assault upon either agent. The court, therefore,
assumed that the reversal of his conspiracy conviction destroyed the sole basis of his
responsibility for the assault count. 486 F.2d at 1345. Accordingly, the court reversed
his conviction and dismissed the charge against him. Id. at 1346.
Rosa had shoved one of the agents in an apparent effort to escape, therefore there
was sufficient evidence to allow a jury to conclude that he was guilty of a direct assault.
Id. at 1342, 1345. Although the federal district court judge gave an appropriate instruction pertaining to a direct assault, his alternative instruction, citing the existence of a
conspiracy as a basis of responsibility, rendered the jury finding uncertain. Id. at 1345.
Consequently, the court reversed Rosa's assault conviction, but remanded the case for a
new trial. Id. at 1346. See Mills v. United States, 164 U.S. 644, 649 (1897) (reversing
rape conviction where jury charge failed to convey proper meaning of consent).
'9 486 F.2d at 1346-47. On rehearing, the court determined that the assault committed by Alsondo was not a remote and unforeseeable consequence "of a conspiracy of
indefinite scope and duration"; instead, it was the direct result of an agreement in
which Feola and Rosa played active roles. Id. at 1347. Criminal responsibility was
founded, therefore, upon the general principles of agency, and the lack of a specific
conspiratorial objective among the parties to assault the federal officers in no way lessened their individual culpability for the crime that actually occurred. Id. at 1346-47.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit summarized this approach in United States v. Jones, 374 F.2d 414 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 835
(1967):
There need be no charge of conspiracy to make actions and declarations of joint
actors in furtherance of a common illegal plan admissible against each actor.
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The Government sought review of Feola's case via a writ of
certiorari, 20 and in United States v. Feola, 2 1 the United States Supreme Court dealt with the question of whether knowledge of an
intended victim's status as a federal officer is required to sustain a
conviction under the federal criminal conspiracy statute.2 2 The
Government contended that since the conspiracy represented no
more than an agreement to commit the assault, no greater level of
knowledge or scienter should be required for a conviction on the con23
spiracy charge than is required for the substantive offense of assault.
The Court accepted this proposition, reversed the court of appeals,
and held that knowledge of a victim's federal identity was, for the
most part, irrelevant to a conviction for either the substantive crime
24
of assault upon a federal officer or the related conspiracy offense.
Inquiry into an accused's knowledge or intent was unnecessary in
early criminal lav; 25 however, it is now a well-established principle
that crime is generally defined not only in terms of a prohibited act
or omission, but also with regard to the actor's state of mind.2 6 As a
result, criminal responsibility is generally founded upon the concurrence of the actus retis and some culpable state of mind on the part of
the actor. 27 This mental element is known alternatively as mens rea or
criminal intent. 28 The concept of criminal intent does not provide
fixed guidelines to be easily applied in all situations, but varies depending upon the context in which it is used.29 A criminal intent may
374 F.2d at 418; accord, Davis v. United States, 409 F.2d 1095, 1100 (5th Cir. 1969).
For a complete discussion of Alsondo see Note, 43 FORDHA.\ L. REV. 128 (1974).
2 Since the other defendants had received either suspended or concurrent sente_,
0n, the vonnspiray count, the Government did not seek review of their cases.
United States v. Feola, 95 S. Ct. 1255, 1258-59 & n.5 (1975). Feola, however, received a
sentence of four years' imprisonment on the conspiracy count and three years' probation
for the assault conviction. Id. at 1258. Thus, the reversal of Feola's conspiracy conviction had the effect of setting him free.
21 95 S. Ct. 1255 (1975).
22 Id. at 1258.
23 Id.

at 1259-60.

24 Id. at 1269. See notes 95-96 infra and accompanying text.
25 The criminal law began by meting out penalties solely on the basis of the acts
committed, thereby following the theory that people were responsible "for all the ills of
an obvious kind that their deeds bring upon their fellows." 2 F. POLLOCK & F.
MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 470 (2d ed. 1898).
26 See, e.g., W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 27, at 191-92
(1972) [hereinafter cited as LAFAVE & SCOTT].

27 Id. § 34, at 2:37. See also J. SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE § 127, at 380 (8th ed. 1930).
28 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1137 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).

29 See Kadish, The Decline of Innocence, 26 CAMB. L.J. 273, 273-75 (1968); Perkins,
A Rationale of Mens Rea, 52 HARv. L. REV. 905, 909-10 (1939). Although "intent" could
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be general in nature, requiring no more than a showing that the accused purposely engaged in the prohibited conduct, or it may be
specific, demanding proof that an accused intended his conduct to
produce a certain result. 30 The requirement of criminal intent may
even be eliminated, as in the instances where an accused may be held
criminally liable without any reference to his state of mind or purpose.31 Still other crimes require only a showing of negligence to sup32
port a conviction.
In Feola, the Court approached the issue of the knowledge
necessary to warrant a conviction on the conspiracy charge by first
examining the underlying premise of the Government's case-that
conceivably be "limited to the narrow dictionary definition of purpose, aim, or design,"
its meaning in the substantive criminal law has "encompass[ed] much of what would
ordinarily be described as knowledge." LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 26, § 28, at 197.
The failure to distinguish between a strict definition of "intent" and "knowledge" is, for
the most part,
of little consequence in most areas of the law, as usually there is good reason
for imposing liability whether defendant desired or merely knew of the practical certainty of the results.
Id. (footnote omitted). In the present case, to say that the defendants had knowledge of
their victims' official status would be the equivalent of saying that the defendants had
the specific intent to assault and to conspire to assault federal officers.
30 See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 26, § 28, at 201-02; J.MILLER, HANDBOOK OF
CRIMINAL LAW,

§ 17 (1934).

These crimes have been termed "public welfare offenses," and they represent an
exception to the general requirement of mens rea. Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33
COLUM. L. REV. 55, 56 (1933). The major distinguishing feature of a public welfare
offense is that it emphasizes "regulating the social order" rather than "singling out
wrongdoers for the purpose of punishment or correction." Id. at 72. Consequently, the
focus is on the nature and effects of the criminal act or omission rather than on individual culpability of the actor. See id. at 68. The purpose of this approach is to afford
better protection to the public at large from widespread social injuries at the expense of
the individual who breaks the law unintentionally. See id.
Where a court deems that a statute, silent as to scienter, is intended to protect
against a serious and prevalent public danger, it may decline to read in any requirement
of knowledge which would have the effect of depriving society of that protection. See,
e.g., United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 251-52 (1922) ("modification" of scienter
requirement where purpose of statute would be frustrated); Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v.
Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57, 69-70 (1910) (elimination of scienter consistent with public
policy). A statute which adopts common law terminology, however, will not be divested
of its traditional requirement of mens rea absent a clear showing of legislative intent.
See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952).
32 Under MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d) (1974),
[a] person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense
when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a
nature and degree that the actor's failure to perceive it, considering the nature
and purpose of his conduct and the circumstances known to him, involves a
gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation.
31
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scienter is not a requisite element of an assault upon a federal
officer.33 Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, initially framed the
issue in terms of jurisdiction: whether the "federal officer" designation in the assault statute has a substantive effect, requiring a showing
of scienter as an additional element of the offense, or whether it was
intended merely to confer jurisdiction on the federal courts. 3 4 The
parties apparently viewed the restriction as serving no function
beyond that of insuring a federal interest in the offense committed,
and the premise that an accused need not be aware of the official
capacity of his victim was conceded both by Feola 35 and the Alsondo
court. 3 6 Although the weight of judicial authority supported this
construction,3 7 the Court sua sponte assumed the task of testing its
3395 S. Ct. at 1260.
34Id. at 1260 & n.9. "[D]espite its potential to mislead," the term "jurisdiction" was
employed to characterize a factual element sufficient to warrant federal involvement in
what would otherwise amount to only a state offense. Id. In analyzing the jurisdiction
issue, the Court noted:
The significance of labeling a statutory requirement as "jurisdictional" is not
that the requirement is viewed as outside the scope of the evil Congress intended to forestall, but merely that the existence of the fact that confers federal
jurisdiction need not be one in the mind of the actor at the time he perpetrates
the act made criminal by the federal statute. The question, then, is not whether
the requirement is jurisdictional, but whether it is jurisdictional only.
Id. at 1260 n.9.
is Id. at 1260.
36Id. The Alsondo court noted without comment that the prevailing view within the
Second Circuit was that conviction of assault upon a federal officer was not dependent
upon proof that the defendant had knowledge of his victim's federal status. 486 F.2d at
1342. See, e.g., United States v. Montanaro, 362 F.2d 527, 528 (2d Cir.) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 920 (1966); United States v. Lombardozzi, 335 F.2d 414, 416 (2d
Cir.), ceri. ur,4(, 3
U.S. 914 (.964..
37The Feola Court recognized what it considered "the practical unanimity of the
courts of appeals," that scienter is not a required element of an assault upon a federal
officer. 95 S. Ct. at 1260 (footnote omitted). See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 462
F.2d 423, 427 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 937 (1973); United States v. Kartman,
417 F.2d 893, 894 (9th Cir. 1969); Pipes v. United States, 399 F.2d 471, 472 (5th Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 934 (1969); Bennett v. United States, 285 F.2d 567, 57071 (5.th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 911 (1961).
Justice Stewart, joined in a dissenting opinion by Justice Douglas, described this
consensus as being "both very recent and very shaky." 95 S. Ct. at 1277 n.19. He
emphasized the fact that the majority of decisions prior to 1964 required scienter as a
requisite element of an assault upon a federal officer. Id. See, e.g., Carter v. United
States, 231 F.2d 232, 235 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 984 (1956); Hargett v. United
States, 183 F.2d 859, 865 (5th Cir. 1950); Sparks v. United States, 90 F.2d 61, 63 (6th
Cir. 1937). Even under the Feola rationale, these types of offenses may be excusable
where the defendant lacked knowledge of his victim's status and reasonably believed
that the agent was himself acting unlawfully. For a discussion of mistake see notes
64-66 infra and accompanying text.
The approach taken by the Second Circuit, however, is that Congress did not include a scienter requirement in the language of the assault provision and that
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validity. 38
Beginning its inquiry with an examination of the congressional

intent leading to enactment of the assault provision, the Court
reopened an issue previously considered in Ladner v. United States. a9

In Ladner, two federal agents were wounded by a single discharge
from a shotgun while they were transporting a prisoner in their
automobile. 40 In seeking the legislative purpose behind the statutory
predecessor to the modern assault provision, 4 1 the Court hoped to
define a proper "unit of prosecution"-either the single act of firing
the shotgun or the multiple of officers who were injured by the
blast. 4 2 The Government contended that the congressional goal in
enacting a federal assault statute was " 'to protect the individual officers, as "wards" of the federal government, from personal harm.' "43
Under this approach, the unit of prosecution would be the individual
officer, and there would be as many offenses as there were officers
assaulted or interfered with. 44 The Ladner Court, however, emphasized that it was equally plausible that the statute was intended
[t]he courts should not by judicial legislation change the statute by adding, in
effect, the words "with knowledge that such person is a federal officer."
United States v. Lombardozzi, 335 F.2d 414, 416 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 914
(1964). Accord, Bennett v. United States, supra, 285 F.2d at 570-71.
The confusion regarding the issue of scienter in an assault upon a federal officer
seems to stem mainly from the inclusive scope of the statutory provision tinder which a
prosecution must commence-not only are assaults covered, but also a variety of other
offenses, including resisting, opposing, impeding, or interfering with a federal officer.
18 U.S.C. § 111 (1970). These obstruction offenses have traditionally required proof that
an accused was aware of his victim's status, since "it is [his] official character that
creates the offence." Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197, 205 (1893).
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stewart pointed out that several decisions have
sought to distinguish between the scienter required for an assault upon a federal officer
and that required for the other offenses proscribed in section 111; however, he added
that these efforts were unsupported by prior case law and were "directly at odds with
the history of the provisions." 95 S. Ct. at 1277 n.19. For cases in which courts have
distinguished between the scienter required for an assault conviction and that required
for an obstruction conviction see United States v. McKenzie, 409 F.2d 983, 986 (2d Cir.
1969); United States v. Rybicki, 403 F.2d 599, 601-02 (6th Cir. 1968).
as 95 S. Ct. at 1260. The Government requested that symmetry be established between the scienter required for conviction of an assault on a federal officer and that
needed in a related conspiracy charge. Id. at 1259-60. Realizing the necessity of laying a sound foundation for this decision, the Court indicated that it inist first pass upon
the underlying premise that scienter was not required in an assault. Id. at 1260.
39 358 U.S. 169, ret'g on rehearing 355 U.S. 282 (1958), iere. aff'g by an equally
divided court 230 F.2d 726 (5th Cir. 1956).
40 358 U.S. at 171.
41 Act of May 18, 1934, ch. 299, § 2, 48 Stat. 781.
42 358 U.S. at 173.
43 Id. at 174 (quoting from Government's brief).
44 Id. at 173.
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"to assure the carrying out of federal purposes and interests, and was
not to protect federal officers except as incident to that aim."-45 Under
that view, the unit of prosecution would correspond to the act of
46
obstruction-in Ladner's case, the single act of firing the weapon.
Basing its decision "largely" upon a letter from the then incumbent Attorney General of the United States who had requested the
legislation, 47 the Ladner Court found that the history of the act failed
to support a positive choice between the two goals. 48 Because acceptance of the "wards of the state" theory could lead to "incongruous
results," 49 the Court applied a policy of leniency and chose to protect
federal officers only insofar as their safety related to federal functions
and not as wards of the Government. 5 0 Thus, the Ladner Court, by
45 Id. at 175-76.
4 Id. at 176-77.
47 On January 3, 1934, Attorney General Homer Cummings wrote a letter to Senator
Henry Ashurst, Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, in which he sought
a legislative enactment
"making it a Federal offense forcibly to resist, impede, or interfere with, or to
assault or kill, any official or employee of the United States while engaged in,
or on account of, the performance of his official duties."
358 U.S. at 174 n.3 (quoting from letter from Homer Cummings to Senator Ashurst, Jan.
3, 1934).
The Attorney General went on to illustrate that Congress had already foreseen the
need for such legislation, as evidenced by several isolated statutes dealing with particular federal officers or functions. Id. Cummings sought a broader provision to protect
" 'Federal officers and employees other than those specifically embraced in the
statutes' " already enacted. Id.
Although the Court indicated that additional legislative history was available, the
letter from the Attorney General was apparently the only material examined. See 358
U.S. at 174.
48 358 U.S. at 177. Since Attorney General Cummings sought legislation both "'for
the protection of [federal] investigative and law-enforcement personnel' " and " 'to
further the legitimate purposes of the Federal Government,' " the Court found the letter
did not point precisely to either meaning to the exclusion of the other. Id. at 175 n.3, 177.
49 See id. at 175-78. The Court noted that the interpretation sought by the Government had a tendency to go awry:
[U]nder the meaning for which the Government contends, one who shoots and
seriously wounds an officer would commit one offense punishable by 10 years'
imprisonment, but if he points a gun at five officers, putting all of them in
apprehension of harm, he would commit five offenses punishable by 50 years'
imprisonment, even though he does not fire the gun and no officer actually
suffers injury.
Id. at 177.
The Court also constructed a hypothetical situation in which a defendant locked a
door in an unlawful attempt to prevent the entry of federal officers in the performance
of their duties. Id. at 176. Under the Government's "wards of the state" theory, there
would be as many offenses as there were officers denied entry to the premises. Id.
50 Id. at 177-78. In opting for a policy of leniency, the Court reaffirmed the principle that a clear congressional meaning must be shown before a court may apply the
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deciding the issue on the basis of policy, failed to resolve the question of congressional purpose.
Deprived of a definite statement of legislative intent, the Feola
Court similarly acknowledged both interpretations, but found no need
to choose between competing interests of "federal officers" and "federal functions." 5 1 Instead, the Court viewed the two policies as complementary, holding that "rejection of a strict scienter requirement is
consistent with both purposes." 5 2 Thus reconciling the element of
scienter with the alternate theories of legislative intent, the Court
next considered the means by which Congress chose to implement its
53
purpose .
Whatever the ultimate goal of the legislation, the vehicle
selected to reach its objective was the same-the provision of "a federal forum in which attacks upon named federal officers could be
prosecuted."54 Though the Court found that, by itself, this was an
insufficient reason to conclude that scienter was not intended as an
element of the offense, it did find that a contrary conclusion would
necessarily be based upon a faulty interpretation of the true function
of the federal assault statute. 55 The view that an accused must be

aware of the official capacity of his victim rests squarely upon the
assumption that the federal legislation was intended "to fill a gap in
the substantive law" of those states where only assaults upon state ofharsher of two plausible alternatives. Id. See, e.g., Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81,
83-84 (1955); United States v. Universal C.IT. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221-22 (1952).
5195 S. Ct. at 1261. The Feola Court noted the potential error that could result from
focusing on only one of the statute's apparent aims and went on to accept both legislative goals, thereby endorsing a twofold purpose of the legislation-"to protect both
federal officers and federal functions." Id. (emphasis by the Court).
Actually, the Ladner Court had previously recognized this duality, and had approached the issue not from the standpoint of which purpose was correct, but from the
position that one goal should be given primary consideration, while the other was only
of secondary significance. See 358 U.S. at 174-75. The Government contended that both
purposes were valid, but that federal functions were to be protected only as incidental
to the protection afforded federal officers. See id. at 173-74. The rationale of this proposition lies in the fact that federal processes would suffer " 'in proportion to the number
of individual officers affected' "';therefore, the individual officer must be protected. Id.
at 174 (quoting from Government's brief). The Court disagreed with this view and held
that federal officers should be given protection only as incident to the primary goal of
"prevent[ing] hindrance to the execution of official duty." See id. at 175-76, 178.
52 95 S. Ct. at 1261. The Feola Court also found that "Congress clearly was concerned with the safety of federal officers insofar as it was tied to the efficacy of law
enforcement activities." Id. at 1262. In light of the Court's prior finding that scienter
was not a requisite element under either interpretation of legislative purpose, tie significance of this recognition is greatly diminished.
5 Id. at 1263.
54 Id.

55Id.
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ficers were elevated to aggravated status.5 6 Under the "gap-filler"
theory, the same requirement of specific knowledge on the part of an
accused would be imposed on the federal statute as is customarily
57
required by the state provisions.
Rejecting this argument, the Court noted that the Attorney General had requested legislation not only to cover assaults upon federal
officers, but also to make it a federal offense to kill a federal officer in
the performance of his official duties. 58 The Court reasoned that had
the legislation been intended as a "gap-filler" to the state proscriptions, the homicide provision would not have been included, since
there was no "gap" in existing state homicide laws which already
punished that offense with the utmost severity, irrespective of a
59
victim's occupation or official identity.
Instead, the Court concluded that if federal officers were to receive the protection that Congress intended when it made assaults
upon them punishable in the federal courts, the proposition that an
accused need be aware of his victim's federal identity must be
rejected. 60 Jurisdiction would otherwise be lost to state courts which,
in the language of the Attorney General, " 'afford[ed] but little relief
. . . under the circumstances.' "61 The Court implied that state prosecutions could be adversely influenced by the hostile reception often
afforded enforcement of federal laws in local communities. 6 2 More
specific to Feola's case, the imposition of a strict requirement of sci56 Id. The Feola Court was of the opinion that an assault on a federal agent would
be treated only as a simple assault under some state laws. Id. In his dissenting opinion,
Justice Stewart was even more positive in stating that "state [aggravated] statutes protect ni state offiers. '" Id ;t 1271 It is at least arguable. however, that state provisions
couched in general terms may be broad enough to encompass assaults upon federal
officers as well. For example, New Jersey considers assault and battery as an aggravated
offense where the victim is "any . . . law enforcement officer, acting in the performance
of his duties." N.J. STATr. ANN. § 2A:90-4 (1969). Other jurisdictions have also afforded
aggravated assault status liberally to "police officers" and "peace officers." See, e.g., ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 12-2(b) (Smith-Hurd 1972); N.Y. PENAL CODE § 120.05 (McKinney

1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2702 (1973).
57 95 S. Ct. at 1263. In most jurisdictions, an assault upon a police officer is not
deemed to be aggravated unless the actor has knowledge of the officer's status, hd. at
1270 (Stewart, J., dissenting). See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:90-4 (1969); CAL. PENAL
CODE §§ 241, 243, 245(b) (West 1970), as amended, (West Supp. 1975); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 38, § 12-2(a)(6) (Smith-Hurd 1972).

58 95 S. Ct. at 1263.
59

Id.

60

Id.

6i Id.

at 1264.
at 1262 n.16 (quoting from letter fronm Homer Cummings to Senator Ashurst,

January 3, 1934).
62 Id. at 1263-64. The Court stated:

From the days of prohibition to the days of the modern civil rights movement,
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enter would provide no protection whatsoever to a federal agent acting undercover. 63

The Court, however, would not disregard a defendant's knowledge in every situation, since wrongful intent is still an essential element of a criminal assault. Therefore, a reasonable mistake of fact
could constitute a complete defense by negating even a general mens
rea. 64 For example, if the actions of a federal officer were misinterpreted as an unlawful attack, an individual may be justified in exerting a like amount of force in his own self-defense. 65 Accordingly, the
Court held that responsibility under the federal assault provision was
predicated solely upon "the criminal intent to do the acts therein
specified." 66 The question remained as to what degree of scienter
was necessary to support conviction for conspiring to assault a federal
officer.
Conspiracy is a separate and distinct crime, "serv[ing] ends difthe statutes federal agents have sworn to uphold and enforce have not always
been popular in every corner of the Nation. Congress may well have concluded
that § 111 was necessary in order to insure uniformly vigorous protection of
federal personnel, including those engaged in locally unpopular activity.

Id.
63 Id.
The Court discovered further proof of a congressional intent to protect undercover agents "from the inclusion of the term 'Secret Service operative' in the list
of protected officials in the 1934 Act." Id. at 1264 n.18.
64 Id.
at 1264.
65 Id. For further discussion of the defense of a reasonable mistake of fact see 1 R.
ANDERSON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LA\W AND PROCEDURE § 157 (1957); LAFAvE &
SCOTT, supra note 26, § 47, at 356-57; MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.05, Comment 1 (Tent.
Draft No. 8, 1958).
In theory, the proper function of a reasonable mistake of fact defense is to negate
the existence of a general criminal intent, thereby destroying an element of the prima
facie case. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra at 356. In practice, however, such a mistake is
generally treated as a defense to be raised by the accused. Id. Although the general
view within the circuits is that scienter is not required for the conviction of an assault
upon a federal officer, see note 37 supra, the courts have noted this exception. See, e.g.,
United States v. Perkins, 488 F.2d 652, 654-55 (lst Cir. 1973) (both the mistake as to
identity and the amount of force used in response must be reasonable); United States v.
Young, 464 F.2d 160, 163 (5th Cir. 1972) (scienter irrelevant where defendant has demonstrated a criminal intent); United States v. Rybicki, 403 F.2d 599, 601-02 (6th Cir.
1968) (scienter significant where identity of victim makes actions which are otherwise
innocent criminal).
The Feola Court noted that the defense of a reasonable mistake of fact should be
available wherever an accused lacks knowledge of the official identity of his intended
victim and could reasonably have interpreted the officer's actions to be "the unlawful
use of force directed either at the defendant or his property." 95 S. Ct. at 1264. The
defense has been recognized where a defendant reasonably believed an officer was
stealing his auto (United States v. Rybicki, supra at 601-02); was about to commit a
robbery (Hargett v. United States, 183 F.2d 859, 860-61 (5th Cir. 1950)); and was trespassing on his property (Sparks v. United States, 90 F.2d 61, 62-63 (6th Cir. 1937)).
66 95 S. Ct. at 1264-65.
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ferent than, and complementary to those served by criminal prohibitions of the substantive offense." 6 7 It has been defined as "a confederation to effect an unlawful object by lawfud means, or by unlawful
means a lawful object. '" 68 To be guilty of conspiracy, a person must
have not only the intent to effectuate an illicit scheme but also the
intent to join as a member of the common criminal plan-he must "inten[d] to combine with one or more persons to further the unlawful
design." 69 Thus the essence of a conspiracy lies in the agreement be70
tween the parties.
Two purposes are served by the individual treatment afforded
the crime of conspiracy. First, the law of conspiracy provides a vehicle to cope with the added danger to society posed by concerted
criminal activity.71 This danger is manifested not only in the increased likelihood that the criminal objective will be achieved, but
also by the more complex, comprehensive schemes normally associated
with group activity.72 Second, by recognizing conspiracy as a separate
offense, a criminal plan may be effectively thwarted while still in its
inchoate stages. 73 It Would appear that nothing in either of these
purposes would demand a stronger showing of criminal intent than
that required for the underlying offense-in this case, assault.
Although the respondent conceded that scienter was not a requisite element of the substantive crime, he nevertheless urged that it
was necessary for the Government to establish that he had knowledge
of the federal identity of his victim in order to sustain a conviction for
67 Id. at 1268.
6 1 R. ANDERSON,

VHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 82, at 171 (1957)

(footnote olitted). See also Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197, 203 (1893); J.
MILLER, HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW § 32, at 108 (1934).
69 Zumwalt, The Conspiracy Confusion, TRIAL, July/August 1974, at 27 (footnote
omitted). See also Harno, Intent in Criminal Conspiracy, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 624, 64647(1941).
70 See, e.g., United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 542 (1947); United States v. Falcone, 311 U.S. 205, 210 (1940); 1 R. ANDERSON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE § 82, at 173 (1957).
71 See J. NILLER, HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW § 32, at 110-14 (1934). Regarding
the crime of conspiracy, the Supreme Court has stated:
For two or more to confederate and combine together to commit or cause to
be committed a breach of the criminal laws, is an offense of the gravest
character, sometimes quite outweighing, in injury to the public, the mere commission of the contemplated crime. It involves deliberate plotting to subvert
the laws, educating and preparing the conspirators for further and habitual
criminal practices.
United States v. Rabinoxwich, 238 U.S. 78, 88 (1915).
72 Developnents in the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REV. 920, 923-25
(1959).

73 See id. at 922; LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 26, § 61, at 459.
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conspiracy to assault a federal officer. 74 The Court found no support
for this proposition in the language of the general conspiracy statute
which makes it an offense merely to " 'conspire . . . to commit any
offense against the United States.' "75 In the majority's view, the
plain language of the provision seemed to impose no greater requirement of scienter in conspiracy than that necessary for the substantive offense itself.7 6 Furthermore, two prior decisions by the

Supreme Court were viewed as "implicitly" rejecting the respondent's contention. 77 However, in those cases, criminal responsibility
was founded either upon the theory of negligence 78 or strict liabil7495 S. Ct. at 1265.

75Id. (quoting from 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1970)).
76 95 S. Ct. at 1265.
77Id. Although there were no prior Supreme Court decisions to support the
respondent's contention that a greater degree of knowledge was required for conspiracy
than for conviction of an assault upon a federal officer, the Court was unable to cite any
direct authority opposing the proposition. Id. The Alsondo court had previously noted
a "dearth of direct authority" on the issue, but explained the lack of precedent by theorizing that a conspiracy to assault a federal officer would not generally occur "except
perhaps as incident to another, more serious crime." 486 F.2d at 1343. The Feola Court,
however, offered a more plausible explanation-that the difficulties of prosecuting a
crime involving a specific antifederal intent have been avoided "by the simple expedient of inferring the requisite knowledge from the scope of the conspiratorial venture."
95 S. Ct. at 1266 (footnote omitted). For example, in Nassif v. United States, 370 F.2d
147 (8th Cir. 1966), the defendants were charged with conspiracy to steal goods in interstate commerce. Id. at 149. In discussing the defendant's intent, the court noted:
Clearly, if the plan was to steal merchandise only from a known defined local
source [the defendant] might have been guilty of conspiracy to steal or conceal,
which only a state may punish. But ifthe scheme is to steal goods, wherever
thes' may be found, and in fact, goods are stolen from interstate commerce, then
we feel the scope of the conspiracy can be broad enough to imply intent to
commit a federal crime.
Id. at 153 (footnote omitted). Accord, United States v. Garafola, 471 F.2d 291, 291-92
(6th Cir. 1972); United States v.Ciinini, 427 F.2d 129, 130 (6th Cir. 1970).
Although the theory of inferred intent may be an attractive solution to the problem,
the Alsondo court foreclosed any possible resort to its use by noting that the defendants
could not have reasonably anticipated that their supposed criminal associates wsere federal officers. 486 F.2d at 1:344. Instead, the court found it "altogether unlikely that
would-be swindlers swould knowingly . . . assume even the most remote risk of such
occurrence." Id.at 1345.
718The first case noted by the Court was In re Coy, 127 U.S. 731 (1888). In Coy, the
defendants were charged with conspiring to influence the outcome of an election that
included national as well as local candidates. Id.at 743-48. The defendants argued that
no federal offense had been committed, since they onls\ intended to tamper ssith the
state ballots. ld.at 753. Taking notice of the legislative goal "of securing purity in elections and accuracy in the returns," the Court characterized the offense as one in which a
shoswing of negligence alone was sufficient basis for the imposition of criminal responsibility. Id. at 754-55. For a discussion of the theory of criminal negligence see note 32
supra and accompanying text. Even if an antifederal intent was required to support a
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ity; 79 therefore, neither conspiracy had as its underlying object an offense involving mens rea.
Thus, finding no direct support in prior decisions, the Court examined what it considered to be the sole support for Feola's
position-the rationale set forth by Judge Learned Hand in
United States v. Crininins.80 In Crimmins, the defendant had been
convicted of conspiracy to transport stolen securities in interstate
commerce.81 Although the prosecution established that Crimmins was
aware that the bonds he received were stolen, it was not shown that
he knew they were stolen out of state.82 The issue on appeal was
whether it was necessary to prove knowledge of the interstate nature
83
of the bonds for a conviction under the federal conspiracy statute.
Assuming arguendo that scienter was not a required element of
the substantive offense, the Crimmins court turned its attention to
the conspiracy charge, noting the general principle that parties to a
conspiracy may be held criminally responsible for the acts of coconspirators "infurtherance of the joint venture" if those acts are w%
ithin
"the reasonable intendment of the common understanding."84
Since
the crime as Crimmins understood it did not include any interstate
dealings, Judge Hand viewed the resulting federal nature of the
crime as possibly going beyond Crimmins' reasonable intentions. 85
He analyzed the situation in a passage that has been designated the
traffic light' analogy":
While one mav , for instance, be guilty of running past a traffic light
of whose existence one is ignorant, one cannot be guilty of conspirconviction, the same could have been reasonably inferred from the fact that the names
of both federal and state candidates were included on the same ballot and handled in

the same manner. See 127 U.S. at 751-52.
19The second case relied upon, United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971), is
clearly a strict liability case. In Freed, the Court reviewed a lower court ruling dismissing an indictment charging both possession and conspiracy to possess unregistered
hand grenades in violation of the National Firearms Act. Id. at 604-05, 607. Describing
the statute as "a regulatory imeasure in the interest of public safdety,"
the Court found
that proof of a specific intent was unnecessary as an element of the substantive offense
of possession. 1d. at 607, 609-10. And, insofar as an agreement to possess hand grenades
could hardly be considered an innocent act, the Court found the imposition of a greater
requirement of scienter upon the related charge of conspiracy to be likewise unnecessary. Id. at 609 n.14. For it discussion of strict liability see note 31 supra.
'0 123 F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1941). See 95 S. Ct. at 1266.
8I d. at 272.
82

d.

83See id.
84 Id. at 27:3.
85 Id.
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ing to run past such a light, for one cannot agree to run past a light
unless one supposes that there is a light to run past. 86

Declining to pass on the overall validity of the analogy, the Feola
Court appeared satisfied to limit its potential applicability to offenses
predicated upon strict liability. 8 7 The Court saw no danger of unfairly
imposing criminal sanctions upon those who agree to apparently innocent conduct later shown to be against the law, for a person cannot
agree to assault another " 'of whose existence [he] is ignorant.' "88
Viewed in this fashion, the traffic-light analogy was not only "bad
law" as applied to the facts in Feola, but also an inappropriate solution for Criminins, since both assault and the receipt of stolen goods
involve conduct which is knowingly wrongful although the full identity of the victim of an assault or the exact location from which goods
have been stolen may not be known by the actor. 89 Thus rejecting
Criminins, the Court accepted the argument that no greater intent
was required to sustain a conviction for conspiracy than was required
for conviction of the substantive offense, at least where the substantive offense already involved an element of mens rea. 90
The Court also rejected the alternate ground of Criin ins-that
conspiratorial liability could not be based upon the existence of a
jurisdictional element which was unknown to the parties. 9 1 The Court
86 Id.See 95 S. Ct. at 1266.
87 95 S. Ct. at 1267. The Feola Court did not render a positive endorsement of the
traffic light analogy, even where it is applied to cases involving strict liability; instead,
the issue was "save[d] for another day." Id.
18Id. The Court noticed a similarity between the traffic light analogy and the
'Powell doctrine.' " Id. In People v. Powell, 63 N.Y. 88 (1875), the Court of Appeals of
New York sought to distinguish a "conspiracy" from a simple agreement to do an act
which later turns out to be against the law, by requiring an evil purpose in the former
instance. Id. at 92. In holding that a conspiracy is more than mere concert, the court
stated:
Persons who agree to do an act innocent in itself in good faith and without the
use of criminal means, are not converted into conspirators because it turns out

that the contemplated act was prohibited by statute.
Id.
The Feola Court further qualified this principle "to the effect that a conspiracy, to
be criminal, must be animated by a corrupt motive or a motive to do wrong." 95 S. Ct.
at 1267. Cf. Developments in the Law--Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARv. L. REv. 920,
936-37 (1959).
89 95 S. Ct. at 1266-67.
90 Id. at 1267.
9iId. at 1267-68. It has been uniformly accepted that a conspirator need not be
aware of the precise details of the criminal venture to be criminally responsible for
engaging in a conspiracy:
[Tihe law rightly gives room for allowing the conviction of [conspirators] upon
showing sufficiently the essential nature of the plan and their connections with
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refused to accept the proposition that such an action would expand
the scope of the parties' agreement beyond its reasonable intendment; instead, it posed the rhetorical question:
[D]oes the identity of the proposed victim alter the legal character
to the nature of
of the acts agreed to, or is it no more germane
92
hair?
victim's
the
of
color
the
than
acts
those

Applying the same reasoning to both assault and conspiracy, the
Court found an agreement to assault no less blameworthy and no less
dangerous "solely because the participants are unaware which body of
law they intend to violate. -9 Thus, the Court held that knowledge of
element of an
an intended victim's official identity was not a required
94
assault or a conspiracy to assault a federal officer.
The majority, however, noted two caveats: First, since scienter
was relevant to conspiracy to the same extent that it was relevant to
the substantive offense of assault upon a federal officer, the accused's
lack of knowledge might in some cases go so far as to negate the
existence of a general mens rea.9 5 Second, since a mere agreement to
assault is insufficient to warrant federal intervention, it must additionally be shown that had the object of the conspiracy been carried out,
the victim would, in fact, have been a federal officer. 96
The majority's resolution of the scienter requirement in the substantive offense of assault was arrived at "without the benefit of either
briefing or oral argument by counsel. "'97 Justice Stewart, in a dissenting opinion joined in by Justice Douglas, criticized the majority's
timing of the Feola decision as premature, since the question of what
knowledge should be required for a conviction of the substantive
ofe-nse of assault was placed squarely before the Court in a pending
petition for certiorari. 98 In his view, the Court's determination
it, without requiring evidence of knowledge of all its details or of the participation of others.
Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 557 (1947) (footnote omitted). See also Sigers
v. United States, .321 F.2d 843, 847 (5th Cir. 1963); Lefco %.United States, 74 F.2d 66,
68 (3d Cir. 1934); Allen v. United States, 4 F.2d 688, 691 (7th Cir. 1925).
92 95 S. Ct. at 1268.
93 Id. at 1268-69.
94 Id. at 1269.
9-1d. See notes 64-65 supra and accompanying text.
96 95 S. Ct. at 1269. Federal intervention is not warranted upon a mere showing of
wrongful intent. There "must be a 'general federal danger,' " that is, "'[t]he agreement
must be dangerous to the federal government, or to an area which the federal government controls.' Developments in the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REX'.
920, 938 (1959) (emphasis in original).
9195 S. Ct. at 1269-70 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
98 Id. The question was never answvered by the Supreme Court, since the case in
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of the scienter issue as it applied to conspiracy before first determining that issue as it applied to the substantive offense of assault
was a "conspicuous disregard of the most basic principle of our adversary system of justice."99
Addressing the substantive issue, Justice Stewart cited the severe
penalties imposed under the assault provision as the surest evidence
that the federal law was intended as a "gap-filler" to the laws of those
states where aggravated status applied only to assaults upon state
officers. 10 0 Furthermore, he identified hvo justifications for imposing
greater sanctions against those who assault public officials:
to reflect the societal gravity associated with assaulting a public officer and, by providing an enhanced deterrent against such assault,
to accord to public officers and their ftinctions a protection greater
than that which the law of assault otherwise provides to private
citizens and their private activities. 101
Justice Stewart concluded that the majority's rejection of a scienter
requirement clearly disregarded the import of these two functions,
since an unknowing assault upon a federal officer could hardly be
deterred if an accused were unaware of his intended victim's federal
status. 10 2 And where the defendant did not intend to assault a public
official, his crime could not reasonably be regarded as any more opprobrious than a similar offense against a private citizen.' 0 3 Moreover, the dissent reasoned that an assailant should only be subjected
to an "aggravated" penalty upon a showing of "aggravating" circumstances, as where he had knowledge, either constructive or implied,
04
that his victim was a public officer.1
In addition to the obvious appeal of making the punishment fit
the crime, the view that the federal law was intended as a counterpart to state aggravated-assault statutes is at least arguably supported
by the legislative history of the provision. 1o5 In a convincing attack on
which it was presented was denied certiorari. See United States v. Fernandez, 497 F.2d
730 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 1423 (1975).
99 95 S. Ct. at 1270.
100 See id. at 1272. For a discussion of the "gap-filler" theory see notes 56-59 supra

and accompanying text.
101 95 S. Ct. at 1270 (footnote omitted).
102 Id. at 1271.
103 Id.

that
The
tion
fect

04Id. See note 57 supra. Under Justice Stewart's reasoning, it is not necessary
an assailant have knowledge that his victim is a federal officer. 95 S. Ct. at 1271.
governmental body which employs the public official is relevant only to the qtues of jurisdiction. Id. It plays no role as an element of the crime "for it does not afthe moral gravity of the act." Id.
105 Justice Stewart observed that the original assault statute of 1934 prohibited the
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the very foundation of the majority's rejection of that view, Justice
Stewart emphasized the contrasting treatment afforded the homicide
and assault sections in the 1934 Act, thereby exposing the weakness
in the Court's examination that went only so far as to note the physical pairing of the two sections. 10 6 In dealing with homicides, Congress, through cross-referencing, adopted the graded penalty scheme
which was already imposed on such killings "within the maritime,
admiralty, and territorial jurisdiction of the United States"; however,
it declined the opportunity to cross-reference the assault section, preferring instead to provide an entirely new structure of punishments.107 On the basis of this observation, Justice Stewart argued
that "[u]nless ...
Congress was scatterbrained, we must conclude that it regarded the victim-status element as of substantive
-and not merely jurisdictional-importance. "108
Support for this conclusion was also found in the language of the
federal assault provision which included offenses such as obstructing
and interfering with a federal officer in the performance of his official
duties. 109 These crimes have traditionally required proof that the defendant knew that the person he obstructed or interfered with was a
public officer. 110 To avoid the inference that an assault must likewise
have a scienter requirement, the Court made a distinction that an
assault was wrongful no matter who was intended as a victim, and,
therefore, prosecution under the federal assault statute even in the
absence of scienter was "no snare for the unsuspecting. "11' This
assault of a federal officer "only if perpetrated 'on account of the performance of his
official duties.' " 95 S. Ct. at 1272 (quoting f rom Act of' May 18, 1934, ch. 299, § 2, 48
Sta. 78!) ('em.phsis by IH
Stewart). From this he concluded that scienter was a
requisite element of the crime as the statute originally appeared. 95 S. Ct. at 1272.
Although the present law proscribes assaults upon an officei "while engaged in .. .the
performance of his official duties," 18 U.S.C. § 111 (1970), Justice Stewart denied the
significance of this change in language, contending that it derived from a 'technical
alteration- in 1948 which "produced no instructive legislative history.' 95 S. Ct. at
1272.
10695 S. Ct. at 1273. The majority had previously focused its attention on the dual
sections of the Act of Max 18, 1934, and concluded that the assault section could be
treated no differently from the homicide section, since both were included in "one bill
with a single legislative history." 95 S.Ct. at 1263, 1264 n.18.
107 1d. at 1273 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
108 Id.
109Id. at 1275. See 18 U.S.C. § 111 (1970).

"o In prior cases, both the Supreme Court and lower courts have refused to hold a
party strictly liable for obstructing or interfering with a federal officer. See, e.g.,
Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. [97, 205-07 (1893); United States v. NlcKenzie, 409
F.2d 983, 986 (2d Cir. 1969); United States v. Rybicki, 403 F.2d 599, 601-02 (6th Cir.
1968).
. 95 S.Ct. at 1264.
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rationale, however, fosters the proposition that not only are all assaults wrong, but that "it is 'fair' to regard them all as equally
wrong."

12

Relying upon the state proscriptions which uniformly require scienter as an element of the aggravated offense, Justice Stewart characterized the Court's interpretation as posing a genuine threat of injustice to those who commit an unknowing assault upon a federal
officer. 113 The question is whether a similar injustice would occur
upon acceptance of scienter as an element of the crime; i.e., whether
it would be "unfair" to permit an assault upon a federal officer to be
prosecuted in a state court as a simple assault.' 14 In finding the federal officer requirement to be "jurisidictional only," 115 the Court
selected a policy in which the federal interest in punishing assaults
and conspiracies to assault certain enumerated officials overrides the
occasional unfairness that may result from the severe sanctions imposed on the perpetrator of an unknowing offense. 116 Apparently, the
reason for this policy decision was the Court's fear that the state
courts would not provide adequate protection to officers engaged
in the enforcement of federal laws. 11 7 This interpretation, however,
112

Id. at 1276 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).

113

Id.

Imposing a scienter requirement on the assault provision would not result in
allowing the perpetrator of an unknowing assault to go completely unpunished. He
Would still be answerable under the general law of assault. Id. at 1271. This is the same
protection afforded state officers when they are assaulted by individuals who are unaware of their official status. Id.
114

s See note 34 supra.

The Feola Court, apparently disregarding the increase of penalties, viewed the
assault provision as imposing no consequence beyond a change in forum. See 95 S. Ct.
at 1264. In United States v. Fernandez, 497 F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 95 S.
Ct. 1423 (1975), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit also rendered
a decision against the imposition of a scienter requirement on the substantive offense of
assault. 497 F.2d at 738. Unlike Feola, the Fernandez court plainly stated that its interpretation posed a risk of injustice, since persons who committed an unknowing assault upon a federal officer could "pay an inappropriately harsher price for their
ignorance.- Id. The court, nevertheless, justified its choice of policy on the ground that
a contrary finding would impede prosecutions:
If knowledge were made an element, conviction, of course, would become
dependent upon the state of mind of the defendant, and successful prosecution
would necessarily become more speculative. . . . Opening the floodgates to
countless unknown difficulties could only emasculate the protection the Congress intended. We hesitate to take such a step.
Id. (footnote omitted).
1'7The Court gleaned support for its holding by reconciling portions of the statute's
legislative history with the allegedly unpopular nature of federal laws, concluding that
state officials wou!d not always or necessarily share congressional feelings of
116
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is little more than a supposition, and, as Justice Stewart pointed
out, there is no actual evidence that Congress, when it passed the
assault statute, was concerned either with the unpopular nature of
federal laws or with a lack of aggressive prosecutions in the individual states. 1 8 Furthermore, the reference to state courts found
in the legislative history of the enactment could be plausibly explained as dissatisfaction with the state statutory scheme of penalties,
rather than a condemnation of the local courts.'1 9
Even if it were assumed that the state courts are loath to prosecute an assault upon a federal officer engaged in locally unpopular
activities, the elimination of scienter as an element of the offense is a
questionable means of providing protection. The heavier penalties
imposed under the federal assault provision can hardly act as a deterrent when an assailant is unaware of the federal identity of his inaftended victim. 120 In such a case, the only protection reasonably 121
assault.
criminal
a
against
prohibitions
general
the
from
is
forded
Regardless of the nature of a federal officer's activities, a knowing
assault is the only type of offense that could be deterred by the threat
22
of an increased penalty.1
Interpreting the present federal statute as mandating a finding of
scienter would not necessarily represent a repudiation of the federal
interest in assaults committed upon governmental officials, since at
least two alternatives exist whereby jurisdiction could be maintained
in all such cases. Under one proposed plan, the federal code could be
revised to separate all jurisdictional factors from the elements of the
crimes contained therein. 123 Once a federal interest was shown, no
further significance would attach to the jurisdictional base. 124 In this
to the fedmanner, the jurisdictional bases would provide a g ,ateway
eral criminal laws without confusing substantive and jurisdictional isurgency as to the necessity of prompt and vigorous prosecutions of those who
violate the safety of the federal officer.

95 S. Ct. at 1263.
'18 Id. at 1274-75.
119 Id. at 1275. Justice Stewart supports this interpretation by noting "that, absent

some statute aggravating the offense," such assaults are misdemeanors, a type of offense
which is handled in the " 'police court' " in many states. Id.
120 d. at 1274 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
121 1d.
122Id.
123 See

NATIONAL

COMM'N

ON

REFORM

OF

FEDERAL

CRIMINAL

LAWS,

STUDY

DRAFT OF A NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE § 201 (1970).
124 Id., Comment, at 11. The federal statutes would then parallel those of the states,

since there would he no need to prove knowledge of a jurisdictional factor in either
case. Id. at 11-12.
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sues. This proposed plan would not only benefit the prosecution by

making the federal officer requirement jurisdictional only, 125 but
would also benefit defendants in that the plan calls for a concomitant
26
lessening of assault penalties absent any aggravating circumstances.1
Another solution, less far reaching, is simply to bifurcate the existing
penalty structure for an assault upon a federal officer, providing only
a simple assault penalty where the defendant was unaware of his in27
tended victim's official identity.1
Absent a legislative solution to the dilemma, the question remains one of policy; a choice between steadfastly maintaining jurisdiction or yielding to the thrust of a substantial penalty provision. With
no clear showing that the states are unable or unwilling to judicially
protect federal officers from simple assaults, the increased penalties

under the federal law seem to pose too great a threat of unfairness to persons who unknowingly assault or unwittingly conspire

to assault one who is a federal officer.
John R. Piepenbrinck
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United States v. Alsondo, 486 F.2d at 1343. The court noted that there would be

no problem with the issue of scienter if it were used " 'not as an element of the respective crimes but frankly as a basis for establishing federal jurisdiction.' " Id. (footnote
omitted) (quoting from MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03, Comment, at 112 (Tent. Draft No.
10, 1960)). Barring a legislative change, the Alsondo court ruled that the accused's
knowledge of his intended victim's identity was an element of the crime of conspiracy,
not a simple matter of jurisdiction. 486 F.2d at 1343.
126 Under one proposed revision
to the federal criminal statutes, a simple assault
wOuld be treated as a misdemeanor. NATIONAL COMM'N ON REFORM OF FEDERAL
CRIMINAL LAWS, STUDY DRAFT OF A NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE § 1611 (1970).
Although the proposed code calls for more severe penalties when the usual aggravating
circumstances, such as the seriousness of the injuries inflicted and the use of a weapon
in the attack are present, it provides no additional sanction when an assailant commits a
knowing assault upon a federal agent. See id. § 1612. Knowing assaults may fall within
the purview of the subchapter entitled "Physical Obstruction of Government Function
and Related Offenses," howesver, the consequences are still the same; ciz., the crime is
treated as a misdemeanor. See id. §§ 1301-02.
127 See United States v. Fernandez, 497 F.2d 730, 738 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
95 S. Ct. 1423 (1975).

